STOCKHOLM - The headline estimate for total world military spending for 2015 amounts to
$1676 billion, or about 2.3 per cent of total world gross domestic product (GDP)—often
referred to as the ‘military burden’.1 It is a sum that many people would consider to be
too high.
All government spending involves choices (opportunity costs) between different
priorities and goals. Global military expenditure in particular often raises concerns
about the opportunity cost in terms of spending on human, social and economic
development.
This media backgrounder discusses two questions:
1. How do governments around the world prioritize military as compared to health
expenditure, and how has this changed over the past 15–20 years?
2. What could be achieved at the global level if some of what is currently spent on
military forces were reallocated to realizing the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
agreed by the United Nations in 2015?
Military and health expenditure compared worldwide, 1995–2015
A comparison of government military and health expenditure worldwide requires an
analysis of appropriate and relevant data. SIPRI used data provided by the World
Health Organization (WHO) for general government health expenditure as a share of
GDP, which includes spending at all levels of government—central, regional and local.
The WHO data, which covers 1995–2013, is slightly adjusted to ensure compatibility
with SIPRI military expenditure data as a share of GDP (for further details see box 1).
Regional variations
The data shows that governments worldwide spend a lot more on health than on the
military: 5.9 per cent of global GDP was allocated to public health spending in 2013,
compared with 2.3 per cent to the military for that year. However, this conceals major
regional variations (for further details of the methodology used for the regional and
country comparisons see box 1). Figures 1 to 4 show the share of military and public
health expenditure in GDP worldwide and by region. The share of GDP devoted to
health spending in 2013 varied from 2.8 per cent in Africa to 8.1 per cent in North
America. Likewise, the regional share of military spending in GDP in 2013 varied from
1.4 per cent in Latin America and the Caribbean to 4.6 per cent in the Middle East.
Within the regions there are also considerable subregional variations; for example, the
share of health expenditure in GDP in Central and South Asia was just 1.4 per cent in
2013. In general terms, military expenditure in 2013 was higher in Eastern Europe and
the Middle East (as well as the subregions of Central and South Asia, and North Africa)
than spending on public healthcare.
A clearer picture of health and military spending trends emerges at the country level.
To avoid giving undue weight to one-year variations, and to include countries for which
military spending data is not available for all years, SIPRI’s analysis compares the
average share of military and health spending in GDP for 2011–13. This analysis shows
that of the countries for which data is available, 80 per cent had higher levels of health
spending than military expenditure during that period. Eastern Europe and the Middle
East each had a relatively large proportion of countries that spent more on the military
than on health in 2011–13; as was also the case at the subregional level in North Africa and South Asia.

Democracy and health
Aside from regional variations, one interesting feature of the data is the type of
countries more likely to prioritize health or military spending. Of the countries
included in the comparison, 92 are classed as ‘democracies’ by the Center for Systemic
Peace’s Polity IV database on democracy and autocracy, whereas 20 are classed as
‘autocracies’, with the remainder somewhere in between.2 Of the 92 democracies,
93 per cent spent more on health than the military between 2011 and 2013. While the
data is much more limited for the autocratic countries, it indicates that almost half of
those countries spent more on the military than on health. This suggests that when
governments are at least somewhat accountable to their people, this accountability is
reflected in their budget priorities.

Trends over time
Looking at trends over time, the global military burden barely changed between 1995
and 2015 (hovering at around 2.3 per cent), while over a similar timeframe (1995–2013)
the share of health expenditure in GDP rose from 5.4 to 5.9 per cent (see figures 1 to 4).
The increase in health spending is particularly notable in Africa (1.9 to 2.8 per cent)
and Latin America and the Caribbean (3.2 to 4.3 per cent). Health spending as a share
of GDP also rose in most other regions. However, there was virtually no change in Asia
and Oceania, and there was a significant fall in Eastern Europe (5.2 to 3.2 per cent). At
a subregional level, South East Asia showed a large increase. Meanwhile, the military
burden declined noticeably between 1995 and 2015 in Western and Central Europe (2.1 to 1.5 per cent), as well as at the subregional level of Central and South Asia, and

South East Asia.
In the past two to three years there have been particularly large increases in the
military burden in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, as well as in the subregion of
North Africa. Nonetheless, the military burden in the Middle East in 2015 (5.8 per cent)
remained below its 1995 level (6.4 per cent).
Again, a clearer picture emerges at the level of individual countries. Of the countries for
which data is available, 73 per cent showed an increase in the average share of health
spending in GDP between 1995–97 and 2011–13, with the median health share of GDP
rising from 2.6 to 3.5 per cent. However, a high proportion of countries in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East reduced the average share of health spending as a share of
GDP between 1995–97 and 2011–13. Meanwhile, of the countries for which data is
available, 72 per cent reduced their average military burden between 1995–97 and
2013–15. However, four out of the seven countries in Eastern Europe increased their
average military burden between those time periods.
Overall, the data suggests that the proportion of countries spending more on health
than on the military increased from 61 per cent in 1995–97 to 80 per cent in 2011–13.
Thus, the general trend over the past 20 years is that most countries have increased the
priority they give to public health expenditure, while reducing the priority given to
military spending. However, certain regions, in particular Eastern Europe and the
Middle East, are notable exceptions.
It is unlikely, however, that this rise in health spending and decline in military
spending as a share of GDP represents some sort of deliberate ‘peace dividend’ policy
aimed at redirecting resources from the military to health. A preliminary analysis
suggests that there is no clear relationship between a country’s increase or decrease in
military spending and any change in health spending—countries that increased their
average military burden between 1995–97 and 2011–13 were just as likely to also
increase health spending as a share of GDP as countries that reduced their average
military burden. Moreover, there is virtually no statistical correlation between the
changes in the two variables.